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So far, most of existed single-shot quantum coin flipping(QCF) protocols failed in a noisy quantum
channel. Here, we present a nested-structured framework that makes it possible to achieve partially
noise-tolerant QCF, due to that there is a trade-off between the security and the justice correctness.
It is showed that noise-tolerant single-shot QCF protocols can be produced by filling the presented
framework up with existed or even future protocols. We also proved a lower bound of 0.25, with
which a cheating Alice or Bob could bias the outcome.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Coin flipping is one of the fundamental cryptographic
primitives, establishing a random bit between two spa-
tially separated parties, Alice and Bob. The original
coin flipping protocol was firstly introduced by Blum in
1981 in the classical setting[1]. Merely three years later,
Bennett and Brassard extended the same idea to quan-
tum domain by proposing a, hereafter, well-known quan-
tum protocol, namely ”BB84” protocol[2]. Not surpris-
ingly, it raised naturally an important theoretical prob-
lem that whether there exists a perfect coin flipping pro-
tocol in which no party can totally control the outcome?
Fortunately, this problem was resolved in more than a
decades later by Mayers and Lo and Chau, who proved
that perfect coin flipping is impossible even in the quan-
tum setting[3, 4], since it is widely accepted that classi-
cal cryptography based on unproven computational com-
plexity assumptions might be cracked by quantum com-
puters.
The first quantum coin flipping(QCF) protocol, i.e.,
”BB84” protocol, has been found a serious security prob-
lem that dishonest Alice can control the protocol entirely,
i.e., she is able to achieve a bias of 0.5, by performing a re-
mote steering attack[2], though it is elegant as a template
for some subsequent variants[5–8]. Hence, Aharonov et
al. announced an improved one(ATVY), aiming to van-
quish the remote steering attack, based on a quantum bit
escrow protocol[5]. However, the bias of their protocol, of
which the bound is proved up to be 0.354[9], is not desir-
able yet. Later, Ambainis using qutrits (more than one
qubit) devised a new QCF protocol whose bias is greatly
reduced to 0.25[6]. In addition, Spekkens and Ruldolph
independently proved that fair QCF protocols with the
same bias, 0.25, can be built upon a restricted class of
quantum bit commitment protocols[10]. Further, Kitaev
pushed this bound down to (
√
2 − 1)/2 ≈ 0.21 using
semidefinite programms(SDP)[11]. A few years later, his
result was substantiated by Chailloux and Kerenidis[12],
who announced a QCF protocol following from the con-
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struction of using a weak QCF protocol described by
Mochon[13] as a subroutine, and proved that its bias is
arbitrarily close to Kitaev’s bound. In 2011, Ha¨nggi and
Wullschleger have proved new tight bounds of cheating
probability p in both classical and quantum cases, for in-
stance, p =
√
(1 −H)/2 corresponds to the quantum set-
tings, where H denotes the honest abort probability[14].
Above work mostly contribute to strong quantum coin
flipping, in which the flavor of each party is not restricted
by a fixed outcome. We also have a weak version of QCF
[15–19] differing from the strong one only in that the pref-
erences of the parties are known to each other in advance,
a more strict definition of these two variants is presented
in Refs.[13] and [12]. One of the most significant moti-
vations of initiating the study of weak QCF is to achieve
perfect coin flipping, which is proved disappointed by
its strong versions. Most generally, the bias of a weak
QCF protocol is lower than its counterpart, since one
can trivially unbalance a strong QCF scheme such that
the bias of the desired outcome can be lowered at the
expense of the undesired one[15]. Remarkably, Spekkens
and Ruldolph described a protocol whose bias is at most
(
√
2 − 1)/2. Later, it is tightened by Mochon who de-
clared a protocol achieving a bias of 0.192[18, 19], and
thereafter using Kitaev’s formalism, namely semidefinite
programming, proved that the bias of weak QCF can be
made arbitrarily small[13].
Interesingly, QCF has also been fertilised by new
paradigms with focus on the multiparty scenario. Ambai-
nis et al. investigated multiparty QCF by including both
weak QCF and strong QCF as the components, hence the
protocol seems more likely to be a tournament in which
the parties are divided into pairwise subgroups[20]. It is
also further studied in real-life applications, such as the
leader election[21].
It is known that real-world quantum cryptography sys-
tems, e.g., the intriguing quantum key distribution, have
always been suffering from some imperfections[22, 23].
Indeed, there is no exception for QCF. In other words,
QCF is also sensitive to some deviations from its theo-
retical model, such as the noise. With the motivation
of implementing a real-life QCF system, quantum bit-
string generation has been proposed to minimize the un-
expected effect of noise[24, 25]. However, Berl´ın et al.
2argue that the same goal can be achieved with purely
classical means[7]. It still leaves open that whether there
exist nontrivial single-shot QCF protocols of which the
expected performance can be achieved in the presence of
noise?
Of particular attention, loss is an even bigger threat to
a practical QCF implementation. Differing from that in
quantum key distribution, it is not difficult for a dishon-
est party to take advantage of it for a malicious purpose
without even being caught cheating. In fact, any QCF
protocol is such a cunning two-party game that a loss-
tolerant protocol is always obtained at a price. QCF was
first reviewed in the loss-tolerant aspect by Berl´ın et al.
who constructed their protocol (BBBG09)upon the BB84
template, the price for a loss-tolerant characteristic is
that the bias increased dramatically to 0.4[7]. They also
experimentally verified their protocol in practical quan-
tum channels[26], as is a great progress upon the first
QCF experiment by G.Molina-Terriza et al. in 2005[27].
Subsequently, Aharon et al. presented a class of loss-
tolerant protocols without the use of bit commitment,
and the bias can be reduced, though not so remarkably[8].
With the same purpose, Chailloux recently announced a
new protocol in which a classical encryption step is added
to Berl´ın et al.’s, and it approximately produces a bias of
0.359[28]. Later, Anna Pappa et al. proposed a practical
QCF protocol[29] regarding all possible environmental
imperfections including loss, noise and the photon source.
Their protocol also uses the template of BBBG09 proto-
col, except that they replace the photon source with a
weak pulse laser. Recently, it is reported that they suc-
ceeded in experimentally carrying out a plug-and-play
QCF scheme using commercial devices[30].
In this paper, we continue to answer the question in
Ref.[29] that how to develop new ways to reduce the effect
of noise on the honest abort probability. We present a
nested structure, with which one can produce a serious
of partially noise-tolerant QCF protocols, only with an
acceptable price of justice correctness. The rest of paper
is organized as follow: In Sec.II, a framework, referring to
the nested structure, is introduced. Then, the security is
investigated conditioned with channel noises and losses
in Sec.III, and a lower bound is also obtained. In the
following section, the justice correctness is discussed. At
last, a conclusion is drawn.
II. FRAMEWORK
It is necessary to formalize a quantum noisy channel
before we present the framework. A natural way to de-
scribe the dynamics of an open quantum system is to
regard it as arising from an interaction between the sys-
tem of interest, which we shall call the principal system,
and an environment, which together form a closed quan-
tum system. It is obvious that a quantum channel is
inevitable of a loss as well as noise in practice, thus we
introduce a parameter η to quantify the degree of the
loss. Since either party can replace a perfect channel or
detection apparatus, we set η = 1.
We define ρenv = |0〉〈0| as the initial state of the envi-
ronment in a three-level quantum system He. The envi-
ronment quantum state transform can be written as
ε(ρ) = TrB(Ue(ρ0(1) ⊗ |0〉〈0|)U †e ). (1)
Here, ρx is the quantum state Alice prepares in a
Hilbert space HA, and the subscript x(x = 0 or 1) stands
for the encoding of the state. Ue, which describes the
noisy channel, is a unitary operator acting on the com-
posite system HA ⊗He.
Bob measured the received qubit ρ0(1) in a basis ran-
domly chosen from the ones, in which Alice prepares her
own qubits. This can be described by a POVM operator
Πm. Therefore, the error rate denoted by p
e
xˆ is written
as
pe0(1) = Tr[Π1(0)ε(ρ)] (2)
where
∑
0,1Πi = I.
Since there is a real channel noise and considering a
honest Alice, if Bob measures a different result in com-
parison with Alice’s one, he has no reason to abort the
protocol. On the contrary, Alice may cheat Bob like this:
She simply declares her desired bit to Bob after he has
revealed his classic bit. Consequently, if Bob’s measure-
ment is not corresponding with Alice’s announcement,
Alice would blame it to a imperfection of the quantum
system. In other words, Bob is unable to verify between
a cheating strategy and a truth. Here, to generalize the
common property of noise-based cheating, we define the
notion that one can not verify the truth of the other
party’s word as ’Blinding Area’(BA).
Following the same idea, Alice might also take advan-
tage of BA to perform the noise-based cheating as follow:
By the time she has to reveal the classical information,
she could announce whatever bit she likes with no risk.
BA occurs when Bob’s measurement result is inconsistent
with Alice’s information, i.e., Bob cannot tell whether it
is resulted from the noise or Alice’s intention. Conse-
quently, Bob may abort the protocol in case of judging
a honest Alice as a cheater due to a genuine error, as is
referred to an event of justice error.
The central problem that existed single-shot QCF pro-
tocols failed in a noisy channel is all due to the pres-
ence of BA. Therefore, we are motivated to exploit a
new technique to reduce its effect. Here, we present a
framework initialized by the idea of weighing the noise-
tolerance with the justice correctness. As is showed in
Fig. 1, a nested structure, in which hundreds of QCF
protocols are correlated, corresponds to the presented
framework. Each element protocol Pi (i = 1, 2, ..., n) is
chosen from existed or even future QCF protocols, which
might be loss-tolerant as well. Protocol Pi, triggered by
Pi−1 where BA occurs, produces an outcome coin(0 or
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FIG. 1: Schematics of our framework. It is composed of n
elements, denoted as Pi (i = 1, 2, ..., n). Here, BA, for exam-
ple in Pi, acts an output port which produces a ”true” result,
which immediately triggers the next element Pi+1, only if BA
takes places there. Otherwise, protocol Pi outputs an out-
come coin 0 or 1. ∞ at the end of the picture indicates the
outcome as ”failure”.
1) with a certain probability, only if it is in absence of
BA. Notice that the framework might fail in outputting
a legitimate outcome at the nth level if BA occurs in
Pn. Also, parameter n should be fixed before Alice and
Bob begin to run the framework, since it is important to
bound the biases of both Alice and Bob.
III. PERFORMANCE
Before we begin to prove a maximum bias for Alice or
Bob, it is necessary to summarize some definitions. The
QBER denoted by 0 ≤ Pe ≤ 1, given by pexˆ from Eq.2,
is used to quantify the degree of error. We denote by
Prob{TA, HB} the successful probability for a cheating
Alice using a tricky strategy TA while Bob is honest.
Therefore, an ideal QCF protocol enjoys an equal success
probability for both parties who are honest, i.e.,
Prob{HA, HB} = 1
2
. (3)
If one of them uses cheating strategy and the rest re-
mains honest, it can be written as
∀TA Prob{TA, HB} ≤ p, (4)
∀TB Prob{HA, TB} ≤ q, (5)
where p is the maximal probability for cheating Alice
and q for Bob. If we implement a QCF protocol in a
practical quantum channel, the security criteria is given
by the following two inequalities,
∀TA Prob{HA, TB, Pe} ≤ PA. (6)
∀TB Prob{HA, TB, Pe} ≤ PB (7)
After introducing channel noises, the cheating proba-
bility for Alice immediately turns to be
PA = p∗ + (p− p∗)× (1− Pe) + p× Pe, (8)
where p∗ is the probability that Bob cannot verify Alice’s
commitment, for example when his measurement basis is
not consistent with Alice’s.
For Bob, we have
PB = q × (1− Pe) + q × Pe. (9)
Obviously, Eqs.8 and 9 imply that Both Alice and Bob
performed the same strategies that they ever used in a
noiseless scenario.
A. Maximal Biases
Conventionally, one may presume that a cheating
party, Alice or Bob, is powerful enough to do anything
only constrained by quantum mechanics. Therefore, the
noisy channel may be replaced by the cheater with a
noiseless one in advance, as is a natural way to maxi-
mize the bias. Here, we shall generalize the biases as
functions of the noise rate Pe, to make a better interpre-
tation of the framework performance, maximal ones are
just obtained by letting Pe = 0. Moreover, only the case
of Pe < 0.5 is taken into account. For Pe > 0.5, a clever
Alice would always reveal the opposites of her original
bits, otherwise she will be a victim of channel noises. In
other words, the probability, that a honest Bob will ob-
tain a measurement result consisted with the original a
honest Alice reveals, is only 1 − Pe, which is lower than
0.5. Therefore, it is reasonable to consider only a case of
Pe < 0.5, according to this symmetry.
Interestingly, it is natural from Eqs.8 and 9 that any
QCF protocol involves to a perfect one while Pe = 0.5,
i.e.,
PA = PB = 0.5. (10)
In this case, any QCF protocol seems to be an ”empty”
scheme, since the randomness of the outcome coin is to-
tally controlled by the channel.
4Using classical probability theory, we have calculated
the biases, given by Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Before
this, we should define PA0 , PB0 ≡ 1, for Alice and Bob,
respectively. Also, we need a further assumption that the
optimal cheating strategy, which Alice or Bob performs
on the presented framework, is a combination of the ones
on each element Pi in a noiseless channel.
Lemma 1: Given n = N for the presented framework,
Alice’s bias εA is calculated by
P
(N)
A = εA + 0.5 =
N∑
i=1
PAi
i−1∏
j=0
PAj . (11)
Proof For n = 1, we have P
(1)
A = PA1 , where PA1 is
the successful probability that cheating Alice biases the
coin to her like in protocol P1. For the case of n = 2, it
is easy to find
P
(2)
A = PA1 + PA1 × PA2 . (12)
PA1 corresponds to the probability that BA took place
in P1. Thus, P2, triggered by BA in P1, produces an
outcome with a probability of PA1 ×PA2 . With the same
technique, the probability that Pn(n = 3, 4, ..., N) pro-
duces an outcome is given by PAn
∏n−1
i=1 PAi . Accounting
with all cases, one immediately has
P
(N)
A = PA1 + PA2PA1 + · · ·+ PAN
N−1∏
i=1
PAi , (13)
which concludes the proof.
Following the same template, we have lemma 2 to cal-
culate Bob’s bias.
Lemma 2: Given n = N for the presented framework,
Bob’s bias εB is calculated by
P
(N)
B = εB + 0.5 =
N∑
i=1
PBi
i−1∏
j=0
PBj . (14)
Corollary 1: The framework cannot be totally con-
trolled by any cheating party, given Pi is a secure QCF
protocol for all is, i.e.,
P
(N)
A < 1, P
(N)
B < 1 (15)
See Appendix for the proof.
From Lemmas 1 and 2, it is seen that P
(N)
A and P
(N)
B
simultaneously increase as N grows up, since we have
P
(n)
A(B) − P
(n−1)
A(B) = PA(B)n
∏n−1
i=1 PA(B)i > 0. In other
words, the security of the presented framework degrades
as N increases. However, it is possible that the frame-
work ends up with a justice error, that a honest Alice is
caught cheating due to the presence of noise taking place
in the Nth round referred to PN .
B. Justice Error
Next, we shall investigate the justice error of our frame-
work, in response to the former claim ”weighing the
noise-tolerance with the justice correctness”. Since jus-
tice error only occurs in a situation where Alice is honest
and Bob is able to verify her commitment, it is not diffi-
cult to compute the justice error rate by
Psys =
N∏
i=1
(1− p(i)∗ )PNe , (16)
where Psys denotes the rate.
Obviously, the more frequently we restart the proto-
col, the smaller Psys is, and it reaches to zero when N
approaches infinity. In this case, the framework is nearly
broken, while the justice error never occurs. Interest-
ingly, partial noise-tolerance property is achieved with an
acceptable loss of justice correctness when N is set finite.
Let p∗ = 0.5, referring to protocols in which only two
nonorthogonal basis are employed, we have Psys ≤ 0.25
for N = 1 and Psys ≤ 0.063 for N = 2, given Pe previ-
ously assumed to be less than 0.5. Therefore, it is happy
to see that N = 2 is sufficient enough to reduce the effect
of justice errors.
Note that justice error is a systematic price for the
noise-tolerant property, yet it repays us the expected se-
curity of most single-shot QCF protocols which were sup-
posed to fail in noisy channels.
C. Optimal Situation
It is clear from above that there is a trade-off between
the security and the justice correctness, although the pre-
sented framework is partially noise tolerant. Of course,
parameter N can be forced to be 1, i.e., Bob firmly calls
Alice a cheater in case of x 6= xˆ despite it is possibly
due to the channel noises. Consequently, the probabil-
ity of being betrayed by a real noise for a honest Alice
is up to 0.25, which is likely to be unacceptable in real-
life applications. In addition, it shouldn’t be neglected
that in real life implementation, a cheating party is pre-
sumed to have unlimited capacity, including replace the
noisy channel with a noiseless one to maximize his or her
benefit. We have loosely plotted P
(N)
A as a function of
Pe with prefixed parameters in Fig2. It is showed that a
cheating Alice will gain the most benefit from the channel
noises by replacing the channel, i.e., Pe = 0. Similarly,
Bob is encouraged to do so before he decides to cheat
Alice.
In an ideal case, where each element protocol Pi is
perfect, i.e., PAi = 0.5 and PBi = 0.5 adapted from the
argument of Ha¨nggi and Wullschleger, optimal biases of
the presented framework is achieved. Table 1 is a list of
the results for the ideal case in specific Ns, it is showed
that the security is increasingly discounted with N be-
coming larger. Even the protocol is only allowed to be
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FIG. 2: Successful probability of Alice as a function of Pe. (a)The curves are plotted with different Ns, by setting p
∗ = 0.5 and
p = 0.8 for each element Pi, i.e.,each element Pi shares the same cheating probability. (b)The curves are plotted with different
ps, and for each we set N = 2. The date point labeled by a rectangle box is directly explained by Eq.8.
TABLE I: Some results referring to the ideal cases
N Pi P
(N)
A(B)
εA(B)
2 0.50 0.7500 0.2500
3 0.50 0.8750 0.3750
4 0.50 0.9375 0.4375
5 0.50 0.9688 0.4688
6 0.50 0.9844 0.4844
restarted once, the increase of successful cheating prob-
abilities for both Alice and Bob reach up to 0.25. It can
be inferred that the bias is approximately approaches 0.5
with N being sufficiently large, yielding that our frame-
work is completely broken. Combining with the justice
error rate, it is good to set N = 1 when Pe is far less
than 0.5. Otherwise, one should consider to restart the
protocol when BA occurs, i.e., let N = 2.
If we fill the framework with BBBG09 protocol and
a perfect QCF protocol, for example, Lemmas 1 and 2
produce the following two inequalities
P
(2)
A <
3
4
+
1
4
αβ + [1− (3
4
+
1
4
αβ)] × 0.5, (17)
P
(2)
B < α
2 + (1− α2)× 0.5. (18)
Consider a fair scenario, we have
3
4
+
1
4
αβ+[1−(3
4
+
1
4
αβ)]×0.5 = α2+(1−α2)×0.5, (19)
subject to α2 + β2 = 1. Solving this system yields
α2 = 0.9, β2 = 0.1, (20)
which immediately conclude
εA = εB = 0.45. (21)
Replacing BBBG09 protocol with Chailloux’s
scheme[28], we obtain a fair bias of 0.4295.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have solved a practical problem in implementing
single-shot QCF protocols in real-life channels, we proved
that partial noise-tolerance property is achievable using
a nested-structured framework, at an acceptable price.
However, the bias produced by filling the framework up
with existed loss-tolerant QCF protocols is still unsatis-
fying, it is still meaningful to further develop new loss-
tolerant QCF protocols with smaller biases. In addition,
is it possible to introduce our framework to weak QCF
protocols? Our future work will be focused on above
concerns.
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VI. APPENDIX OF COROLLARY
According to Lemma 1, we have
P
(N)
A ≤
N∑
i=1
PAi
i−1∏
j=0
PAj , (22)
which can be rewritten as
6P
(N)
A ≤
∑N−2
i=1 PAi
∏i−1
j=0 PAj
+PAN−1
∏N−2
j=0 PAj
+PAN
∏N−1
j=0 PAj .
(23)
Consequently, it equivalently evolves to
P
(N)
A ≤
∑N−2
i=2 PAi
∏i−1
j=0 PAj
+(PAN−1 + PAN−1PAN )
∏N−2
j=0 PAj .
(24)
Given that 12 < PAi < 1 is true for all is, hence
PAN−1 + PAN−1PAN < 1. (25)
Thus, the following inequality also holds
P
(N)
A <
∑N−2
i=1 PAi
∏i−1
j=0 PAj +
∏N−2
j=0 PAj
=
∑N−3
i=1 PAi
∏i−1
j=0 PAj + PAN−2
∏N−3
j=0 PAj
+PAN−2
∏N−3
j=0 PAj
=
∑N−3
i=1 PAi
∏i−1
j=0 PAj +
∏N−3
j=0 PAj .
(26)
Using the same technique, we have
P
(N)
A <
∑N−4
i=1 PAi
∏i−1
j=0 PAj +
∏N−4
j=0 PAj
...
<
∑1
i=1 PAi
∏i−1
j=0 PAj +
∏1
j=0 PAj
= PA1 + PA1
= 1.
(27)
Following the same steps, one could also obtain P
(N)
B <
1.
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